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What exactly is Universal Grammar,
and has anyone seen it?
Ewa Da˛browska*
Department of Humanities, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
Universal Grammar (UG) is a suspect concept. There is little agreement on what exactly is
in it; and the empirical evidence for it is very weak. This paper critically examines a variety
of arguments that have been put forward as evidence for UG, focussing on the three
most powerful ones: universality (all human languages share a number of properties),
convergence (all language learners converge on the same grammar in spite of the fact
that they are exposed to different input), and poverty of the stimulus (children know
things about language which they could not have learned from the input available to
them). I argue that these arguments are based on premises which are either false or
unsubstantiated. Languages differ from each other in profound ways, and there are
very few true universals, so the fundamental crosslinguistic fact that needs explaining
is diversity, not universality. A number of recent studies have demonstrated the existence
of considerable differences in adult native speakers’ knowledge of the grammar of
their language, including aspects of inflectional morphology, passives, quantifiers, and
a variety of more complex constructions, so learners do not in fact converge on the
same grammar. Finally, the poverty of the stimulus argument presupposes that children
acquire linguistic representations of the kind postulated by generative grammarians;
constructionist grammars such as those proposed by Tomasello, Goldberg and others
can be learned from the input. We are the only species that has language, so there must
be something unique about humans that makes language learning possible. The extent
of crosslinguistic diversity and the considerable individual differences in the rate, style and
outcome of acquisition suggest that it is more promising to think in terms of a language-
making capacity, i.e., a set of domain-general abilities, rather than an innate body of
knowledge about the structural properties of the target system.
Keywords: Universal Grammar, language universals, poverty of the stimulus, convergence, individual differences,
language acquisition, construction grammar, linguistic nativism
Introduction
The Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis—the idea that human languages, as superficially diverse
as they are, share some fundamental similarities, and that these are attributable to innate principles
unique to language: that deep down, there is only one human language (Chomsky, 2000a, p. 7)—has
generated an enormous amount of interest in linguistics, psychology, philosophy, and other social
and cognitive sciences. The predominant approach in linguistics for almost 50 years (Smith, 1999,
p. 105: described it as “unassailable”), it is now coming under increasing criticism from a variety of
sources. In this paper, I provide a critical assessment of the UG approach. I argue that there is little
agreement on what UG actually is; that the arguments for its existence are either irrelevant, circular,
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or based on false premises; and that there are fundamental
problems with the way its proponents address the key questions
of linguistic theory.
What Exactly is UG?
Universal Grammar is usually defined as the “system of categories,
mechanisms and constraints shared by all human languages and
considered to be innate” (O’Grady et al., 1996, p. 734; cf. also
Chomsky, 1986, p. 3, 2007, p. 1; Pesetsky, 1999, p. 476). These
are generally thought to include formal universals (e.g., principles,
i.e., general statements which specify the constraints on the
grammars of human languages, and parameters, which specify the
options for grammatical variation between languages) as well as
substantive universals (e.g., lexical categories and features). There
is very little agreement, however, on what these actually are.
Chomsky (1986) sees UG as “an intricate and highly
constrained structure” (p. 148) consisting of “various subsystems
of principles” (p. 146). These include “X-bar theory, binding
theory, Case theory, theta theory, bounding theory . . . and
so forth – each containing certain principles with a limited
degree of parametric variation. In addition there are certain
overriding principles such as the projection principle, FI (full
interpretation), and the principles of licensing. . . [UG also
contains] certain concepts, such as the concept of domain . . .
and the related notions of c-command and government” (p.
102). However, every major development in the theory since
then was accompanied by very substantial revisions to the list
of proposed universals. Thus the list of UG principles is quite
different when we move to the Barriers period, and radically
different in Minimalism (see below).
With respect to parameters, very few scholars have even
attempted to give a reasonably comprehensive inventory of what
these are. Two rare exceptions are Baker (2001), who discusses
10 parameters, and Fodor and Sakas (2004), who list 13. In both
cases, the authors stress that the list is far from complete; but it
is interesting to note that only three parameters occur on both
lists (Tomasello, 2005; see also Haspelmath, 2007). There is no
agreement even on approximately how many parameters there
are: thus Pinker (1994, p. 112) claims that there are “only a
few”; Fodor (2003, p. 734) suggests that there are “perhaps 20”;
according to Roberts and Holmberg (2005, p. 541), the correct
figure is probably “in the region of 50–100.” However, if, following
Kayne (2005), we assume that there is a parameter associated
with every functional element, the number of parameters must
be considerably larger than this. Cinque and Rizzi (2008), citing
Heine and Kuteva’s (2002) work on grammaticalization targets,
estimate that there are about 400 functional categories. According
to Shlonsky (2010, p. 424), even this may be a low estimate.
Shlonsky (2010) also suggests that “[e]very feature is endowed
with its own switchboard, consisting of half a dozen or so binary
options” (p. 425), which implies that there are thousands of
parameters.
Things are no better when we consider substantive universals.
While most generative linguists agree that the inventory of lexical
categories includes N, V, and A, there is little agreement on what
the functional categories are (see Newmeyer, 2008; Corbett, 2010;
Pullum andTiede, 2010; Boeckx, 2011). Newmeyer (2008) surveys
some of the relevant literature and concludes:
“There is no way to answer this question that would satisfy
more than a small number of generativists. It seems fair to
say that categories are proposed for a particular language
when they appear to be needed for that language, with little
thought as to their applicability to the grammar of other
languages. My guess is that well over two hundred have
been put forward in current work in the principles-and-
parameters tradition.” (p. 51)
The situation, Newmeyer (2008) observes, is even less clear
when it comes to features:
“Evenmore than for categories, features tend to be proposed
ad hoc in the analysis of a particular language when some
formal device is needed to distinguish one structure (or
operation on a particular structure) from another. As a
result, supplying even a provisional list of what the set of
universal distinctive syntactic featuresmight be seems quite
hopeless.” (p. 53)
Thus, some linguists see UG as a very elaborate structure,
consisting of a large number of principles, parameters, and
categories. At the other extreme, we have the strong minimalist
thesis, according to which UG may comprise just the structure-
building operation Merge (cf. Chomsky, 2004, 2012; Berwick
et al., 2011). It seems that the only point of agreement amongst
proponents of UG is that it exists; they do not agree on what it
actually contains. What evidence, then, is there for the existence
of specifically linguistic innate knowledge? I turn to this question
in the next section.
Arguments for UG
Over the years, a number of arguments have been put forward in
support of the UG hypothesis. These include the following:
(1) Language Universals: (All) human languages share certain
properties.
(2) Convergence: Children are exposed to different input yet
converge on the same grammar.
(3) Poverty of the Stimulus: Children acquire knowledge for
which there is no evidence in the input.
(4) No Negative Evidence: Children know which structures are
ungrammatical and do not acquire overgeneral grammars in
spite of the fact that they are not exposed to negative evidence.
(5) Species Specificity: We are the only species that has language.
(6) Ease and Speed ofChild LanguageAcquisition: Children learn
language quickly and effortlessly, on minimal exposure.
(7) Uniformity: All children acquiring language go through the
same stages in the same order.
(8) Maturational Effects: Language acquisition is very sensitive
to maturational factors and relatively insensitive to
environmental factors.
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(9) Dissociations between Language and Cognition: Some
clinical populations have (relatively) normal language and
impaired cognition; some have impaired cognition and
(relatively) normal language.
(10) Neurological Separation: Different brain circuits are
responsible for representing/processing linguistic and
non-linguistic information.
Arguments 1–4 are generally regarded as the most powerful
ones; 5–10 are subsidiary in the sense they only provide support
for the idea of innateness of language general, rather than the
innateness of a specific aspect of linguistic organization, and they
are also open to other interpretations. I begin by evaluating the
subsidiary arguments, and then move on to the more powerful
ones.
Species Specificity
“To say that language is not innate is to say that there is
no difference between my granddaughter, a rock and a
rabbit. In other words, if you take a rock, a rabbit and my
granddaughter and put them in a community where people
are talking English, they’ll all learn English. If people believe
that, then they believe that language is not innate. If they
believe that there is a difference betweenmy granddaughter,
a rabbit, and a rock, then they believe that language is
innate.” (Chomsky, 2000b, p. 50)
Clearly, there is something unique about human biological
make-up that makes it possible for humans, and only humans,
to acquire language. However, nobody disputes this, so in the
passage quoted above Chomsky is fighting a straw man. The
crucial question is whether the relevant knowledge or abilities
are language-specific or whether they can be attributed to more
general cognitive processes—and this is far from clear.
There are a number of other characteristics which appear to
be specific to our species. These include collaboration, cultural
learning, the use of complex tools, and—surprisingly—the use
of pointing and others means of drawing attention to particular
features of the immediate environment, such as holding objects up
for others to see.1 This suggests there may be a more fundamental
difference between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom.
As Tomasello et al. (2005) put it, “saying that only humans have
language is like saying that only humans build skyscrapers, when
the fact is that only humans (among primates) build freestanding
shelters at all” (p. 690). Tomasello et al. (2005) argue that language
is a consequence of the basic human ability to recognize others’
communicative intentions and to engage in joint attention, which
also underlies other cultural achievements.
The ability to read and share intentions, including
communicative intentions—i.e., theory of mind in the broad
1Our nearest relatives, the great apes, do not point and do not understand
pointing gestures (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 2005). Dogs do
understand human pointing, which is believed to be a consequence of
domestication (Hare et al., 2002); they do not, however, use pointing gestures
themselves. “Pointing” dogs do not intentionally point things out to others:
they merely look at the game, enabling the human hunter to follow their line
of sight.
sense—is important for language for two reasons. First, it enables
the language learner to understand what language is for: an
animal that did not understand that other individuals have beliefs
and intentions different from its own would have little use for
language. Secondly, it provides the learner with a vital tool for
learning language. In order to learn a language, one must acquire
a set of form-meaning conventions; and to acquire these, learners
must be able to guess at least some of the meanings conveyed by
the utterances they hear.
The human ability to read and share intentionsmay not explain
subjacency effects—the existence of other differences between
humans and other species does not entail lack of UG, just as
species specificity does not entail its existence. The point is that
arguments for the innateness of language in a general sense (what
Scholz and Pullum, 2002 call “general nativism”) do not constitute
arguments for the innateness ofUG (“linguistic nativism”) if UG is
taken to be a specific body of linguistic knowledge. In other words,
the fact that we are the only species that has language does not
entail that we have innate knowledge of subjacency.
Ease and Speed of Child Language Acquisition
It has been often suggested that children acquire grammatical
systems of enormous complexity rapidly and effortlessly on the
basis of very little evidence, and by “mere exposure,” that is to
say, without explicit teaching (see, for example, Chomsky, 1962,
p. 529, 1976, p. 286, 1999; Guasti, 2002, p. 3). In fact, they get
vast amounts of language experience. If we assume that language
acquisition begins at age 1 and ends at age 5 and that children are
exposed to language for 8 h a day, they get 11680 h of exposure
(4 × 365 × 8 = 11680). At 3600 input words per hour (the
average number of words heard by the children in theManchester
corpus),2 this amounts to over 42 million words over 4 years.
Note that this is a rather conservative estimate: we know
that language development begins before age 1 (Jusczyk, 1997;
Karmiloff and Karmiloff-Smith, 2001) and continues throughout
childhood and adolescence (Nippold, 1998; Berman, 2004, 2007;
Nippold et al., 2005; Kaplan and Berman, 2015); moreover,
children are exposed to language—through utterances directed
to them, utterances directed to other people present, radio and
television, and later school, reading and the internet almost every
waking hour of their lives.
Furthermore, we know that “mere exposure” is not enough—as
demonstrated by studies of hearing children of deaf parents (Todd
and Aitchison, 1980; Sachs et al., 1981; see also Da˛browska, 2012,
for some observations on the effects of the quality of the input).
Consider, for example, Jim—one of children studied by Sachs et al.
(1981). In early childhood, Jim had very little contact with hearing
adults but watched television quite frequently, and occasionally
playedwith hearing children.His parents used sign languagewhen
addressing each other, but did not sign to the children. At age 3;9
(3 years and 9months)—the beginning of the study—Jimhad very
poor comprehension of spoken language, and severe articulation
problems. His utterances were very short, with an MLU (mean
length of utterance) of 2.9—typical for a child aged about 2;9.
2TheManchester corpus is described in Theakston et al. (2001) and is available
from CHILDES (MacWhinney, 1995).
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He had low use of grammatical morphemes, producing them in
only 37% of obligatory contexts, while MLU-matched controls
supplied them 64–81% of the time; and many of his utterances
had clearly deviant syntax (My mommy my house eplay ball;
House echimney my house emy chimney). And, interestingly,
although he was exposed to ASL at home, he did not sign. Jim’s
spoken language improved rapidly once he began interacting with
adults on a one-on-one basis, and by age 6;11, he performed
above age level on most measures—showing that he was not
language impaired. Thus, although hewas exposed to both spoken
English (through television and occasional interaction with other
children) and to ASL (though observing his parents), Jim did
not acquire either language until he was given an opportunity to
interact with competent users.
Uniformity
Some researchers (e.g., Stromswold, 2000; Guasti, 2002) have
suggested that children acquire language in a very similar manner,
going through the same stages at approximately the same ages,
in spite of the fact that they are exposed to different input.
Stromswold (2000), for instance, observes that
“Within a given language, the course of language acquisition
is remarkably uniform. . .. Most children say their first
referential words at 9 to 15 months. . . and for the next
6-8 months, children typically acquire single words fairly
slowly until they have acquired approximately 50 words. . ..
Once children have acquired 50 words, their vocabularies
often increase rapidly. . .. At around 18 to 24 months,
children learning morphologically impoverished languages
such as English begin combining words to form two-word
utterances. . .. Children acquiring such morphologically
impoverished languages gradually begin to use sentences
longer than two words; but for several months their speech
often lacks phonetically unstressed functional category
morphemes such as determiners, auxiliary verbs, and verbal
and nominal inflectional endings . . .. Gradually, omissions
become rarer until children are between three and four
years old, at which point the vast majority of English-
speaking children’s utterances are completely grammatical.”
(p. 910)
This uniformity, Stromswold argues, indicates that the course
of language acquisition is strongly predetermined by an innate
program.
There are several points to be made in connection with
this argument. First, many of the similarities that Stromswold
mentions are not very remarkable: we do not need UG to
explain why children typically (though by no means always)
produce single word utterances before they produce word
combinations, or why frequent content words are acquired
earlier than function words. Secondly, the age ranges she gives
(e.g., 9–15 months for first referential words) are quite wide:
6 months is a very long time for an infant. Thirdly, the passage
describes typical development, as evidenced by qualifiers like
“most children,” “typically,” “often”—so the observations are not
true of all children. Finally, by using qualifiers like “within a given
language” and limiting her observations to “children acquiring
morphologically impoverished languages” Stromswold implicitly
concedes the existence of crosslinguistic differences. These are
quite substantial: children acquiring different languages have to
rely on different cues, and this results in different courses of
development (Bavin, 1995; Jusczyk, 1997; Lieven, 1997); and they
often acquire “the same” constructions at very different ages. For
example, the passive is acquired quite late by English speaking
children—typically (though by no means always—see below) by
age 4 or 5, and even later—by about 8—by Hebrew-speaking
children (Berman, 1985). However, children learning languages
in which the passive is more frequent and/or simpler master this
construction much earlier—by about 2;8 in Sesotho (Demuth,
1989) and as early as 2;0 in Inuktitut (Allen and Crago, 1996).
Even within the same language, contrary to Stromswold’s
claims, there are vast individual differences both in the rate and
course of language development (Bates et al., 1988; Richards,
1990; Shore, 1995; Goldfield and Snow, 1997; Peters, 1997;
Huttenlocher, 1998). Such differences are most obvious, and
easiest to quantify, in lexical development. The comprehension
vocabularies of normally developing children of the same age can
differ tenfold or more (Benedict, 1979; Goldfield and Reznick,
1990; Bates et al., 1995). There are also very large differences in the
relationship between a child’s expressive and receptive vocabulary
early in development: some children are able to understand over
200 words before they start producing words themselves, while
others are able to produce almost all the words they know (Bates
et al., 1995). Children also differ with regard to the kinds of words
they learn in the initial stages of lexical development. “Referential”
children initially focus primarily on object labels (i.e., concrete
nouns), while “expressive” children havemore varied vocabularies
with more adjectives and verbs and some formulaic phrases such
as thank you, not now, you’re kidding, don’t know (Nelson, 1973,
1981). Last but not least, there are differences in the pattern of
growth. Many children do go through the “vocabulary spurt” that
Stromswold alludes to some time between 14 and 22 months, but
about a quarter do not, showing a more gradual growth pattern
with no spurt (Goldfield and Reznick, 1990).
Grammatical development is also far from uniform. While
some children begin to combine words as early as 14 months,
others do not do so until after their second birthday (Bates
et al., 1995), with correspondingly large differences in MLU later
in development—from 1.2 to 5.0 at 30 months (Wells, 1985).
Some children learn to inflect words before they combine them
into larger structures, while others begin to combine words
before they are able to use morphological rules productively
(Smoczyńska, 1985, p. 618; Thal et al., 1996). Some children are
very cautious learners who avoid producing forms they are not
sure about, while others are happy to generalize on the basis of
very little evidence. This results in large differences in error rates
(Maratsos, 2000). Considerable individual differences have also
been found in almost every area of grammatical development
where researchers have looked for them, including word order
(Clark, 1985), case marking (Da˛browska and Szczerbiński, 2006),
the order of emergence of grammatical morphemes (Brown,
1973), auxiliary verbs (Wells, 1979; Richards, 1990; Jones, 1996),
questions (Gullo, 1981; Kuczaj andMaratsos, 1983; de Villiers and
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de Villiers, 1985), passives (Horgan, 1978; Fox and Grodzinsky,
1998), and multiclause sentences (Huttenlocher et al., 2002).
Children also differ in their learning “styles” (Peters,
1977; Nelson, 1981; Peters and Menn, 1993). “Analytic” (or
“referential”) children begin with single words, which they
articulate reasonably clearly and consistently. “Holistic” (or
“expressive”) children, on the other hand, begin with larger
units which have characteristic stress and intonation patterns,
but which are often pronounced indistinctly, and sometimes
consist partly or even entirely of filler syllables such as [dadada].
Peters (1977) argues that holistic children attempt to approximate
the overall shape of the target utterance while analytic children
concentrate on extracting and producing single words. These
different starting points determine how the child “breaks into”
grammar, and therefore have a substantial effect on the course
of language development. Analytic children must learn how
to combine words to form more complex units. They start by
putting together content words, producing telegraphic utterances
such as there doggie or doggie eating. Later in development they
discover that different classes of content words require specific
function words and inflections (nouns take determiners, verbs
take auxiliaries, and tense inflections, etc.), and gradually learn
to supply these. Holistic children, in contrast, must segment their
rote-learned phrases and determine how each part contributes
to the meaning of the whole. Unlike analytic children, they
sometimes produce grammatical morphemes very early in
acquisition, embedded in larger unanalysed or only partially
analyzed units; or they may use filler syllables as place-holders
for grammatical morphemes. As their systems develop, the fillers
gradually acquire more phonetic substance and an adult-like
distribution, and eventually evolve into function words of the
target language (Peters andMenn, 1993; Peters, 2001). Thus, while
both groups of children eventually acquire similar grammars,
they get there by following different routes.3
Maturational Effects
Language acquisition is sometimes claimed to be “highly
sensitive to maturational factors” and “surprisingly insensitive to
environmental factors” (Fodor, 1983, p. 100; see also Gleitman,
1981; Crain and Lillo-Martin, 1999; Stromswold, 2000), which,
these researchers suggest, indicates that the language faculty
develops, or matures, according to a biologically determined
timetable.
The claim that language acquisition is insensitive to
environmental factors is simply incorrect, as demonstrated by the
vast amount of research showing that both the amount and quality
of input have a considerable effect on acquisition—particularly
for vocabulary, but also for grammar (e.g., Huttenlocher, 1998;
Huttenlocher et al., 2002; Ginsborg, 2006; Hoff, 2006). There is no
doubt that maturation also plays a very important role—but this
could be due to the development of the cognitive prerequisites for
language (Slobin, 1973, 1985; Tomasello, 2003) rather than the
maturation of the language faculty. Likewise, while it is possible
that critical/sensitive period effects are due to UG becoming
3It should be emphasized that these styles are idealizations. Most children use
a mixture of both strategies, although many have a clear preference for one or
the other.
inaccessible at some point in development, they could also
arise as a result of older learners’ greater reliance on declarative
memory (Ullman, 2006), developmental changes in working
memory capacity (Newport, 1990), or entrenchment of earlier
learning (Elman et al., 1996; MacWhinney, 2008). Thus, again,
the existence of maturational effects does not entail the existence
of an innate UG: they are, at best, an argument for general
innateness, not linguistic innateness.
Dissociations between Language and Cognition
A number of researchers have pointed out that some individuals
(e.g., aphasics and children with Specific Language Impairment)
show severe language impairment and relatively normal
cognition, while others (e.g., individuals with Williams syndrome
(WS), or Christopher, the “linguistic savant” studied by Smith and
Tsimpli, 1995) show the opposite pattern: impaired cognition but
good language skills. The existence of such a double dissociation
suggests that language is not part of “general cognition”—in other
words, that it depends at least in part on a specialized linguistic
“module.”
The existence of double dissociations in adults is not
particularly informative with regard to the innateness issue,
however, since modularization can be a result of development
(Paterson et al., 1999; Thomas and Karmiloff-Smith, 2002);
hence, the fact that language is relatively separable in adults does
not entail innate linguistic knowledge. On the other hand, the
developmental double dissociation between specific language
impairment (SLI) and WS, is, on the face of it, much more
convincing. There are, however, several reasons to be cautious in
drawing conclusions from the observed dissociations.
First, there is growing evidence suggesting that WS language
is impaired, particularly early in development (Karmiloff-Smith
et al., 1997; Brock, 2007; Karmiloff-Smith, 2008). Children
with WS begin talking much later than typically developing
children, and their language develops along a different trajectory.
Adolescents and adults with WS show deficits in all areas of
language: syntax (Grant et al., 2002), morphology (Thomas
et al., 2001), phonology (Grant et al., 1997), lexical knowledge
(Temple et al., 2002), and pragmatics (Laws and Bishop,
2004). Secondly, many, perhaps all, SLI children have various
non-linguistic impairments (Leonard, 1998; Tallal, 2003; Lum
et al., 2010)—making the term Specific Language Impairment
something of a misnomer. Thus the dissociation is, at best, partial:
older WS children and adolescents have relatively good language
in spite of a severe cognitive deficit; SLI is a primarily linguistic
impairment.
More importantly, it is debatable whether we are really dealing
with a double dissociation in this case. Early reports of the double
dissociation between language and cognition in Williams and SLI
were based on indirect comparisons between the two populations.
For instance, Pinker (1999) discusses a study conducted by
Bellugi et al. (1994), which compared WS and Down’s syndrome
adolescents and found that the former have much better language
skills, and van der Lely’s work on somewhat younger children
with SLI (van der Lely, 1997; van der Lely and Ullman, 2001),
which found that SLI children perform less well than typically
developing children. However, a study which compared the two
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populations directly (Stojanovik et al., 2004) suggests rather
different conclusions. Stojanovik et al. (2004) gave SLI and WS
children a battery of verbal and non-verbal tests. As expected,
the SLI children performed much better than the WS children
on all non-verbal measures. However, there were no differences
between the two groups on the language tests—in fact, the SLI
children performed slightly better on some measures, although
the differences were not statistically significant. Clearly, one
cannot argue that language is selectively impaired in SLI and intact
in WS if we find that the two populations’ performance on the
same linguistic tests is indistinguishable.
To summarize: There is evidence of a partial dissociation in SLI
children, who have normal IQ and below-normal language—and,
as pointed out earlier, a variety of non-linguistic impairments
whichmay the underlying cause of their linguistic deficit. There is,
however, no evidence for a dissociation inWilliams syndrome:WS
children’s performance on language tests is typically appropriate
for their mental age, and well below their chronological age.
Neurological Separation
The fact that certain parts of the brain—specifically, the
perisylvian region including Broca’s area, Wernicke’s area and the
angular gyrus—appear to be specialized for language processing
has led some researchers (e.g., Pinker, 1995; Stromswold et al.,
1996; Stromswold, 2000, p. 925; Musso et al., 2003) to speculate
that they may constitute the neural substrate for UG. Intriguing
though such proposals are, they face a number of problems.
First, the language functions are not strongly localized: many
other areas outside the classical “language areas” are active during
language processing; and, conversely, the language areas may
also be activated during non-linguistic processing (Stowe et al.,
2005; Anderson, 2010; see, however, Fedorenko et al., 2011). More
importantly, studies of neural development clearly show that the
details of local connectivity in the language areas (as well as other
areas of the brain) are not genetically specified but emerge as
a result of activity and their position in the larger functional
networks in the brain (Elman et al., 1996; Müller, 2009; Anderson
et al., 2011; Kolb and Gibb, 2011). Because of this, human brains
show a high amount of plasticity, and other areas of the brain
can take over if the regions normally responsible for language
are damaged. In fact, if the damage occurs before the onset
of language, most children develop normal conversational skills
(Bates et al., 1997; Aram, 1998; Bates, 1999; Trauner et al., 2013),
although language development is often delayed (Vicari et al.,
2000), and careful investigations do sometimes reveal residual
deficits inmore complex aspects of language use (Stiles et al., 2005;
Reilly et al., 2013). Lesions sustained inmiddle and late childhood
typically leave more lasting deficits, although these are relatively
minor (vanHout, 1991; Bishop, 1993;Martins and Ferro, 1993). In
adults, the prospects are less good, but even adults typically show
some recovery (Holland et al., 1996), due partly to regeneration of
the damaged areas and partly to shift to other areas of the brain,
including the right hemisphere (Karbe et al., 1998; Anglade et al.,
2014). Thus, while the neurological evidence does suggest that
certain areas of the brain are particularly well-suited for language
processing, there is no evidence that these regions actually contain
a genetically specified preprint blueprint for grammar.
Language Universals
Generative linguists have tended to downplay the differences
between languages and emphasize their similarities. In Chomsky’s
(2000a) words,
“. . . in their essential properties and even down to fine
detail, languages are cast to the same mold. The Martian
scientist might reasonably conclude that there is a single
human language, with differences only at the margins.”
(p. 7)
Elsewhere (Chomsky, 2004, p. 149) he describes human
languages as “essentially identical.” Stromswold (1999) expresses
virtually the same view:
“In fact, linguists have discovered that, although some
languages seem, superficially, to be radically different from
other languages . . ., in essential ways all human languages
are remarkably similar to one another.” (p. 357)
This view, however, is not shared by most typologists (cf. Croft,
2001; Haspelmath, 2007; Evans and Levinson, 2009). Evans and
Levinson (2009), for example, give counterexamples to virtually
all proposed universals, including major lexical categories, major
phrasal categories, phrase structure rules, grammaticalizedmeans
of distinguishing between subjects and objects, use of verb
affixes to signal tense and aspect, auxiliaries, anaphora, and WH
movement, and conclude that
“. . ..languages differ so fundamentally from one another
at every level of description (sound, grammar, lexicon,
meaning) that it is very hard to find any single structural
property they share. The claims of Universal Grammar . . .
are either empirically false, unfalsifiable or misleading in
that they refer to tendencies rather than strict universals.”
(p. 429)
Clearly, there is a fundamental disagreement between
generative linguists like Chomsky and functionalists like Evans
and Levinson (2009). Thus, it is misleading to state that “linguists
have discovered that . . . in essential ways all human languages
are remarkably similar to one another”; it would have been more
accurate to prefix such claims with a qualifier such as “some
linguists think that. . ..”
One reason for the disagreement is that generative and
functional linguists have a very different view of language
universals. For the functionalists, universals are inductive
generalizations about observable features of language, discovered
by studying a large number of unrelated languages—what some
people call descriptive, or “surface” universals. The generativists’
universals, on the other hand, are cognitive or “deep” universals,
which are highly abstract and cannot be derived inductively from
observation of surface features. As Smolensky andDupoux (2009)
argue in their commentary on Evans and Levinson’s paper,
“Counterexamples to des-universals are not
counterexamples to cog-universals . . . a hypothesised
cog-universal can only be falsified by engaging the full
apparatus of the formal theory.” (p. 468)
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This is all very well—but how exactly do we “engage the
full apparatus of the formal theory”? The problem with deep
universals is that in order to evaluate them, one has to make
a number of subsidiary (and often controversial) assumptions
which in turn depend on further assumptions—so the chain of
reasoning is very long indeed (cf. Hulst, 2008; Newmeyer, 2008).
This raises obvious problems of falsifiability. Given thatmost deep
universals are parameterized, that they may be parameterized
“invisibly,” and that some languages have been argued to be
exempt from some universals (cf. Newmeyer, 2008), it is not clear
what would count as counterevidence for a proposed universal.
The issue is particularly problematic for substantive universals.
The predominant view of substantive universals (lexical
categories, features, etc.,) is that they are part of UG, but need not
be used by all languages: in other words, UGmakes available a list
of categories, and languages “select” from this list. But as Evans
and Levinson (2009) point out,
“. . . the claim that property X is a substantive universal
cannot be falsified by finding a language without it, because
the property is not required in all of them. Conversely,
suppose we find a new language with property Y, hitherto
unexpected: we can simply add it to the inventory of
substantive universals. . .. without limits on the toolkit, UG
is unfalsifiable.” (p. 436)
Apart from issues of falsifiability, the fact that deep universals
are theory internal has another consequence, nicely spelled out by
Tomasello (1995):
“Many of the Generative Grammar structures that are
found in English can be found in other languages—if it is
generative grammarians who are doing the looking. But
these structures may not be found by linguists of other
theoretical persuasions because these structures are defined
differently, or not recognised at all, in other linguistic
theories.” (p. 138)
In other words, deep universals may exist—but they cannot be
treated as evidence for the theory, because they are assumed by the
theory.
Returning to themoremundane, observable surface universals:
although absolute universals are very hard to find, there is no
question that there are some very strong universal tendencies,
and these call for an explanation. Many surface universals have
plausible functional explanations (Comrie, 1983; Hawkins, 2004;
Haspelmath, 2008). It is also possible that they derive from a
shared protolanguage or that they are in some sense “innate,”
i.e., that they are part of the initial state of the language
faculty—although existing theories of UG do not fare very well
in explaining surface universals (Newmeyer, 2008).
Generative linguists’ focus on universals has shifted attention
from what may be the most remarkable property of human
languages—their diversity. Whatever one’s beliefs about UG
and the innateness hypothesis, it is undeniable that some
aspects of our knowledge—the lexicon, morphological classes,
various idiosyncratic constructions, i.e., what generative linguists
sometimes refer to as the “periphery”—must be learned, precisely
because they are idiosyncratic and specific to particular languages.
These aspects of our linguistic knowledge are no less complex
(in fact, in some cases considerably more complex) than the
phenomena covered by “core” grammar, and mastering them
requires powerful learning mechanisms. It is possible, then, that
the cognitive mechanisms necessary to learn about the periphery
may suffice to learn core grammar as well (Menn, 1996; Culicover,
1999; Da˛browska, 2000a).
Convergence
“. . . it is clear that the language each person acquires is a
rich complex construction hopelessly underdetermined
by the fragmentary evidence available [to the learner].
Nevertheless individuals in a speech community have
developed essentially the same language. This fact can be
explained only on the assumption that these individuals
employ highly restrictive principles that guide the
construction of the grammar.” (Chomsky, 1975, p. 11)
“The set of utterances to which any child acquiring a
language is exposed is equally compatible with many
distinct descriptions. And yet children converge to a
remarkable degree on a common grammar, with agreement
on indefinitely many sentences that are novel. Mainly for
this reason, Chomsky proposed that the child brings prior
biases to the task.” (Lidz and Williams, 2009, p. 177)
“The explanation that is offered must also be responsive to
other facts about the acquisition process; in particular, the
fact that every child rapidly converges on a grammatical
system that is equivalent to everyone else’s, despite a
considerable latitude in linguistic experience – indeed,
without any relevant experience in some cases. Innate
formal principles of language acquisition are clearly needed
to explain these basic facts.” (Crain et al., 2009, p. 124)
As illustrated by these passages, the (presumed) fact that
language learners converge on the same grammar despite having
been exposed to different input is often regarded as a powerful
argument for an innate UG. It is interesting to note that
all three authors quoted above simply assume that learners
acquire essentially the same grammar: the convergence claim is
taken as self-evident, and is not supported with any evidence.
However, a number of recent studies which have investigated the
question empirically found considerable individual differences
in how much adult native speakers know about the grammar
of their language, including inflectional morphology (Indefrey
and Goebel, 1993; Da˛browska, 2008), a variety of complex
syntactic structures involving subordination (Da˛browska, 1997,
2013; Chipere, 2001, 2003), and even simpler structures such
as passives and quantified noun phrases (Da˛browska and Street,
2006; Street, 2010; Street and Da˛browska, 2010, 2014; for recent
reviews, see Da˛browska, 2012, 2015).
For example, Street and Da˛browska (2010) tested adult
native English speakers’ comprehension of simple sentences with
universal quantifiers such as (1–2) and unbiased passives (3); the
corresponding actives (4) were a control condition.
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(1) Every toothbrush is in a mug.
(2) Every mug has a toothbrush in it.
(3) The girl was hugged by the boy.
(4) The girl hugged the boy.
Participants listened to each test sentence and were asked
to select the matching picture from an array of two. For the
quantifier sentences the pictures depicted objects and containers
in partial one-to-one correspondence (e.g., three mugs, each with
a toothbrush in it plus an extra toothbrush; three mugs, each with
a toothbrush in it plus an extra mug). For actives and passives, the
pictures depicted a transitive event (e.g., a girl hugging a boy and
a boy hugging a girl).
Experiment 1 tested two groups, a high academic attainment
(HAA) group, i.e., postgraduate students, and a low academic
attainment (LAA) group, who worked as shelf-stackers, packers,
assemblers, or clerical workers andwho had nomore than 11 years
of formal education. The HAA participants consistently chose the
target picture in all four conditions. The LAA participants were
at ceiling on actives, 88% correct on passives, 78% on simple
locatives with quantifiers, and 43% correct (i.e., at chance) on
possessive locatives with quantifiers. The means for the LAA
group mask vast differences between participants: individual
scores in this group ranged from 0 to 100% for the quantifier
sentences and from 33 to 100% for passives.
Street and Da˛browska argue that the experiment reveals
differences in linguistic knowledge (competence), not
performance, pointing out that the picture selection task
has minimal cognitive demands (and can be used with children as
young as 2 to test simpler structures); moreover, all participants,
including the LAA group, were at ceiling on active sentences,
showing that they had understood the task, were cooperative, etc.
(For further discussion of this issue, see Da˛browska, 2012.)
Experiment 2 was a training study. LAA participants who
had difficulty with all three of the experimental constructions
(i.e., those who scored no more than 4 out of 6 correct on each
construction in the pre-test) were randomly assigned to either
a passive training group or a quantifier training group. The
training involved an explicit explanation of the target construction
followed by practice with feedback. Subsequently, participants
were given a series of post-tests: immediately after training, a
week later, and 12 weeks after training. The results revealed that
performance improved dramatically after training, but only on
the construction trained, and that the effects of training were
long-lasting—that is to say, the participants performed virtually
at ceiling even on the last post-test. This indicates that the
participants were not language impaired, and that their poor
performance on the pre-test is attributable to lack of knowledge
rather than failure to understand the instructions or to cooperate
with the experimenter.
The existence of individual differences in linguistic attainment
is not, of course, incompatible with the existence of innate
predispositions and biases. In fact, we know that differences
in verbal ability are heritable (Stromswold, 2001; Misyak and
Christiansen, 2011), although it is clear that environmental factors
also play an important role (see Da˛browska, 2012). However,
the Street and Da˛browska experiments as well as other studies
mentioned earlier in this section suggest that the convergence
argument is based on a false premise. Native speakers do not
converge on the same grammar: there are, in fact, considerable
differences in how much speakers know about some of the basic
constructions of their native language.
Poverty of the Stimulus and Negative Evidence
The most famous, and most powerful, argument for UG is the
poverty of the stimulus argument: the claim that children have
linguistic knowledge which could not have been acquired from
the input which is available to them:
“. . .every child comes to know facts about the language for
which there is no decisive evidence from the environment.
In some cases, there appears to be no evidence at all.” (Crain,
1991)
“People attain knowledge of the structure of their language
for which no evidence is available in the data to which they
are exposed as children.” (Hornstein and Lightfoot, 1981,
p. 9)
“Universal Grammar provides representations that
support deductions about sentences that fall outside of
experience. . .. These abstract representations drive the
language learner’s capacity to project beyond experience in
highly specific ways.” (Lidz and Gagliardi, 2015)
The textbook example of the poverty of the stimulus is
the acquisition of the auxiliary placement rule in English Y/N
questions (see, for example, Chomsky, 1972, 2012; Crain, 1991;
Lasnik and Uriagereka, 2002; Berwick et al., 2011). On hearing
pairs of sentences such as (5a) and (5b) a child could infer the
following rule for deriving questions:
Hypothesis A: Move the auxiliary to the beginning of the
sentence.
However, such a rule would incorrectly derive (6b), although
the only grammatical counterpart of (6a) is (6c).
5a The boy will win.
5b Will the boy win?
6a The boy who can swim will win.
6b *Can the boy who swim will win?
6c Will the boy who can swim win?
In order to acquire English, the child must postulate a more
complex, structure dependent rule:
Hypothesis B: Move the first auxiliary after the subject to
the beginning of the sentence.
Crucially, the argument goes, children never produce
questions such as (6b), and they know that such sentences are
ungrammatical; furthermore, it has been claimed that they know
this without ever being exposed to sentences like (6c) (see, for
example, Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980, p. 40, pp. 114–115; Crain,
1991).
A related issue, sometimes conflated with poverty of the
stimulus, is lack of negative evidence. Language learners must
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generalize beyond the data that they are exposed to, but they
must not generalize too much. A learner who assumed an overly
general grammar would need negative evidence—evidence that
some of the sentences that his or her grammar generates are
ungrammatical—to bring the grammar in line with that of the
speech community. Since such evidence is not generally available,
learners’ generalizationsmust be constrained by UG (Baker, 1979;
Marcus, 1993).
Let us begin with the negative evidence problem. Several
observations are in order. First, while parents do not reliably
correct their children’s errors, children do get a considerable
amount of indirect negative evidence in the form of requests
for clarification and adult reformulations of their erroneous
utterances. Moreover, a number of studies have demonstrated that
children understand that requests for clarification and recasts are
negative evidence, and respond appropriately, and that corrective
feedback results in improvement in the grammaticality of child
speech (Demetras et al., 1986; Saxton et al., 1998; Saxton, 2000;
Chouinard and Clark, 2003). Negative evidence can also be
inferred from absence of positive evidence: a probabilistic learner
can distinguish between accidental non-occurrence and a non-
occurrence that is statistically significant, and infer that the latter
is ungrammatical (Robenalt and Goldberg, in press; Scholz and
Pullum, 2002, 2006; Stefanowitsch, 2008).
Secondly, as Cowie (2008) points out, the acquisition of
grammar is not the only area where we have to acquire
knowledge about what is not permissible without the benefit
of negative evidence. We face exactly the same problem in
lexical learning and learning from experience generally: few
people have been explicitly told that custard is not ice-
cream, and yet somehow they manage to learn this. Related
to this, children do make overgeneralization errors—including
morphological overgeneralizations like bringed and gooder and
overgeneralizations of various sentence level constructions (e.g.,
I said her no, She giggled me), and they do recover from them
(cf. Bowerman, 1988). Thus, the question isn’t “What sort of
innate constraints must we assume to prevent children from
overgeneralizing?” but rather “How do children recover from
overgeneralization errors?”—and there is a considerable amount
of research addressing this very issue (see, for example, Brooks and
Tomasello, 1999; Brooks et al., 1999; Tomasello, 2003; Ambridge
et al., 2008, 2009, 2011; Boyd and Goldberg, 2011).
Let us return to the poverty of the stimulus argument. The
structure of the argument may be summarized as follows:
(1) Children know certain things about language.
(2) To learn them from the input, they would need access to data
of a particular kind.
(3) The relevant data is not available in the input, or not frequent
enough in the input to guarantee learning.
(4) Therefore, the knowledge must be innate.
As with any deductive argument, the truth of the conclusion
(4) depends on the validity of the argument itself and the truth
of the premises. Strikingly, most expositions of the poverty of
the stimulus argument in the literature do not take the trouble to
establish the truth of the premises: it is simply assumed. In a well-
known critique of the POS argument, Pullum and Scholz (2002)
analyze four linguistic phenomena (plurals inside compounds,
anaphoric one, auxiliary sequences, auxiliary placement in Y/N
questions) which are most often used to exemplify it, and show
that the argument does not hold up: in all four cases, either
the generalization that linguists assumed children acquired is
incorrect or the relevant data is present in the input, or both.
With respect to the auxiliary placement rule, for example, Pullum
and Scholz (2002) estimate that by age 3, most children will have
heard between 7500 and 22000 utterances that falsify the structure
independent rule.
Lasnik andUriagereka (2002) and others argue that Pullum and
Scholz (2002) have missed the point: knowing that sentences like
(6c) are grammatical does not entail that sentences like (6b) are
not; and it does not tell the child how to actually form a question.
They point out that “not even the fact that [6c] is grammatical
proves that something with the effect of hypothesis B is correct
(and the only possibility [my italics]), hence does not lead to adult
knowledge of English” (Lasnik and Uriagereka, 2002; p. 148), and
conclude that “children come equipped with a priori knowledge
of language. . . because it is unimaginable [my italics] how they
could otherwise acquire the complexities of adult language” (pp.
149–150).
Note that Lasnik andUriagereka (2002) havemoved beyond the
original poverty of the stimulus argument. They are not arguing
merely that a particular aspect of our linguistic knowledge must
be innate because the relevant data is not available to learners
(poverty of the stimulus); they are making a different argument,
which Slobin (cited in Van Valin, 1994) refers to as the “argument
from the poverty of the imagination”: “I can’t imagine how X
could possibly be learned from the input; therefore, it must be
innate.” Appeals to lack of imagination are not very convincing,
however. One can easily construct analogous arguments to argue
for the opposite claim: “I can’t imagine how X could have
evolved (or how it could be encoded in the genes); therefore,
it must be learned.” Moreover, other researchers may be more
imaginative.
The Construction Grammar Approach
Lasnik and Uriagereka (2002) conclude their paper with a
challenge to non-nativist researchers to develop an account of
how grammar could be learned from positive evidence. The
challenge has been taken up by a number of constructionist
researchers (Tomasello, 2003, 2006; Da˛browska, 2004; Goldberg,
2006; for reviews, see Diessel, 2013; Matthews and Krajewski,
2015). Let us begin by examining how a constructionist
might account for the acquisition of the auxiliary placement
rule.
Case Study: The Acquisition of Y/N Questions by
Naomi
Consider the development of Y/N questions with the auxiliary
can in one particular child, Naomi (see Da˛browska, 2000b,
2004, 2010a, also discussed data for two other children from
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the CHILDES database).4 The first recorded questions with can
appeared in Naomi’s speech at age 1;11.9 (1 year, 11 months and
9 days) and were correctly inverted:
1; 11.9 can I get down? [repeated 4x]
1; 11.9 can I get up?
Seven days later there are some further examples, but this time
the subject is left out, although it is clear from the context that the
subject is Naomi herself:
1; 11.16 can eat it ice cream?
1; 11.16 can lie down? [repeated 2x]
In total, there are 56 tokens of this “permission formula” in the
corpus, 25 with explicit subjects.
The early questions with can are extremely stereotypical: the
auxiliary is always placed at the beginning of the sentence (there
are no “uninverted” questions), and although the first person
pronoun is often left out, the agent of the action is invariably
Naomi herself. There are other interesting restrictions on her
usage during this period. For example, in Y/N interrogatives with
can, if she explicitly refers to herself, she always uses the pronoun
I (25 tokens)—never her name. In contrast, in other questions
(e.g., the formulas What’s Nomi do?, What’s Nomi doing?, and
Where’s Nomi?—45 tokens in total) she always refers to herself as
Nomi. Furthermore, while she consistently inverts in first person
questions with can and could, all the other Y/N questions with first
person subjects are uninverted.
As the formula is analyzed, usage becomes more flexible. Two
weeks after the original can I. . .? question, a variant appears with
could instead of can:
1; 11.21 could do this?
2; 0.3 could I throw that?
Five weeks later, we get the first question with a subject other
than I:
2; 0.28 can you draw eyes?
The transcripts up to this point contain 39 questions with can,
including 10 with explicit subjects.
So we see a clear progression from an invariant formula
(Can I get down?) through increasingly abstract formulaic
frames (Can I + ACTION? ABILITY VERB + I + ACTION?)
to a fairly general constructional schema in which none
of the slots is tied to particular lexical items (ABILITY
VERB+ PERSON+ ACTION?).
Questions with other auxiliaries follow different developmental
paths. Not surprisingly, the first interrogatives with will were
requests (will you ACTION?); this was later generalized to
questions about future actions, and to other agents (will PERSON
ACTION?). The earliest interrogatives with do were offers of a
4Naomi’s linguistic developmentwas recorded by Sachs (1983). The transcripts
are available from the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 1995).
specific object (do you want THING?). This was later generalized
to do you ACTION?; but for a long time, Naomi used “do support”
almost exclusively with second person subjects.
Thus, Naomi started with some useful formulas such as request
for permission (Can I ACTION?), request that the addressee do
something for her (Will you ACTION?), and offers of an object
(Do you want THING?). These were gradually integrated into
a network of increasingly general constructional schemas. The
process is depicted schematically in Figure 1. The left hand side
of the figure shows the starting point of development: formulaic
phrases. The boxes in the second columns represent low-level
schemas which result from generalizations over specific formulaic
phrases. The schemas contain a slot for specifying the type
of activity; this must be filled by a verb phrase containing a
plain verb. The schemas in the third column are even more
abstract, in that they contain two slots, one for the activity and
one for the agent; they can be derived by generalizing over
the low-level schemas. Finally, on the far right, we have a fully
abstract Y/N question schema. The left-to-right organization of
the figure represents the passage of time, in the sense that concrete
schemas developmentally precede more abstract ones. However,
the columns are not meant to represent distinct stages, since the
generalizations are local: for example, Noami acquired theCanNP
VP? schema about 6 months before she started to produce Will
you VP? questions. Thus, different auxiliaries followed different
developmental patterns, and, crucially, there is no evidence that
she derived questions from structures with declarative-like word
order at any stage, as auxiliaries in declaratives were used in
very different ways. It is also important to note that the later,
more abstract schemas probably do not replace the early lexically
specific ones: there is evidence that the two continue to exist side
by side in adult speakers (Langacker, 2000; Da˛browska, 2010b).
Da˛browska and Lieven (2005), using data from eight high-
density developmental corpora, show that young children’s novel
questions can be explained by appealing to lexically specific
units which can be derived from the child’s linguistic experience.
Da˛browska (2014) argues that such units can also account for the
vast majority of adult utterances, at least in informal conversation.
One might object that, since the slots in the formulas can be
filled by words or phrases, this approach assumes that the child
knows something about constituency. This is true; note, however,
that constituency is understood differently in this framework: not
as a characteristic of binary branching syntactic trees with labeled
nodes, but merely an understanding that some combinations
of words function as a unit when they fill a particular slot in
a formula. In the constructionist approach, constituency is an
emergent property of grammar rather than something that is
present from the start, and it is sometimes fluid and variable (cf.
Langacker, 1997). Constituency in this sense—i.e., hierarchical
organization—is something that is a general property of many
cognitive structures and is not unique to language.
Understanding Language, Warts, and All
Languages are shot through with patterns. The patterns exist at
all levels: some are very general, others quite low-level. Languages
are also shot through with idiosyncrasies: constructional idioms,
lexical items which do not fit easily into any grammatical
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FIGURE 1 | Progressive schematization. Labels like NP are VP in the figure
are used merely for convenience: we need not assume that the child has
abstract syntactic categories, particularly in the early stages of acquisition. The
slots in early formulas are defined in semantic terms and may be frame
specific, e.g., the VP slot in the Can I VP? formula can be filled with any
expression referring to “something I would like to do.” For ease of exposition, I
am also ignoring the difference between grounded (tensed) and untensed
verbs.
class, irregular morphology. The generative program focuses
on uncovering the deepest, most fundamental generalizations,
and relegates the low-level patterns and idiosyncrasies—which
are regarded as less interesting—to the periphery. But low-
level patterns are a part of language, and a satisfactory theory
of language must account for them as well as more general
constructions.
Construction grammar began as an attempt to account for
constructional idioms such as the X-er the Y-er (e.g., The more the
merrier; The bigger they come, the harder they fall—see Fillmore
et al., 1988) and what’s X doing Y? (e.g., What’s this fly doing in
my soup?, What are you doing reading my diary?—see Kay and
Fillmore, 1999). Such constructional idioms have idiosyncratic
properties which are not predictable from general rules or
principles, but they are productive: we can create novel utterances
based on the schema. As construction grammar developed,
it quickly became apparent that whatever mechanisms were
required to explain low-level patterns could also account for high-
level patterns as a special case: consequently, as Croft (2001) put it,
“the constructional tail has come to wag the syntactic dog” (p. 17).
As suggested earlier, the same is true of acquisition: the learning
mechanisms that are necessary to learn relational words can also
account for the acquisition of more abstract constructions.
Back to Poverty of the Stimulus
It is important to note that the way the poverty-of-the-stimulus
problem is posed (e.g., “how does the child know that the auxiliary
inside the subject cannot be moved?”) presupposes a generative
account of the phenomena (i.e., interrogatives are derived from
declarative-like structures by moving the auxiliary). The problem
does not arise in constructionist accounts, which do not assume
movement.
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More generally, generativist and constructionist researchers
agree about the basic thrust of the POS argument: the child cannot
learn about the properties of empty categories, constraints on
extraction, etc., from the input. What they disagree about is the
conclusion that is to be drawn from this fact. For generative
researchers, the fact that some grammatical principles or notions
are unlearnable entails that they must be part of an innate UG.
Constructionist researchers, on the other hand, draw a completely
different conclusion: if X cannot be learned from the input, then
we need a better linguistic theory—one that does not assume such
an implausible construct.
Thus, one of the basic principles of the constructionist
approach is that linguists should focus on developing “child-
friendly” grammars (Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008; Goldberg,
2003; Tomasello, 2003, 2006; Da˛browska, 2004) rather than
postulate an innate UG. Construction grammar attempts to
capture all that speakers know about their language in terms of
constructions—form-meaning pairings which can be simple or
complex and concrete or partially or entirely schematic (i.e., they
can contain one or more “slots” which can be elaborated by more
specific units, allowing for the creation of novel expressions).
Most construction grammar researchers also assume that children
prefer relatively concrete, lexically-specific patterns which can be
easily inferred from the input; more schematic patterns emerge
later in development, as a result of generalization over the
concrete units acquired earlier (Johnson, 1983;Da˛browska, 2000b;
Tomasello, 2003, 2006; Diessel, 2004). Crucially, the mechanisms
required to learn constructional schemas are also necessary
to acquire relational terms such as verbs and prepositions
(Da˛browska, 2004, 2009). Since we know that children are able
to learn the meanings and selectional restrictions of verbs and
prepositions, it follows that they are able to learn constructional
schemas as well.
Conclusion
As we have seen, contemporary views on what is or is not in
UG are wildly divergent. I have also argued that, although many
arguments have been put forward in favor of some kind of an
innate UG, there is actually very little evidence for its existence:
the arguments for the innateness of specific linguistic categories
or principles are either irrelevant (in that they are arguments for
general innateness rather than linguistic innateness), based on
false premises, or circular.
Some generative linguists respond to criticisms of this kind by
claiming that UG is an approach to doing linguistics rather than
a specific hypothesis. For example, Nevins et al. (2009) in their
critique of Everett’s work on Pirahã, assert that
“The term Universal Grammar (UG), in its modern
usage, was introduced as a name for the collection of
factors that underlie the uniquely human capacity for
language—whatever they may turn out to be . . .. There are
many different proposals about the overall nature of UG,
and continuing debate about its role in the explanation of
virtually every linguistic phenomenon. Consequently, there
is no general universal-grammarmodel for which [Everett’s
claims] could have consequences – only a wealth of diverse
hypotheses about UG and its content.” (p. 357)
This view contrasts sharply with other assessments of the
UG enterprise. Chomsky (2000a), for instance, claims that the
Principles and Parameters framework was “highly successful”
(p. 8), that it “led to an explosion of inquiry into a very broad
range of typologically diverse languages, at a level of depth not
previously envisioned” (Chomsky, 2004, p. 11), and that it was
“the only real revolutionary departure in linguistics maybe in
the last several thousand years, much more so than the original
work in generative grammar” (Chomsky, 2004, p. 148). If Nevins
et al. (2009) are right in their assertion that the UG literature is
no more than a collection of proposals which, as a set, do not
make any specific empirical predictions about languages, then
such triumphalist claims are completely unjustified.
Is it a fruitful approach? (Or perhaps a better question might
be: Was it a fruitful approach?) It was certainly fruitful in the
sense that it generated a great deal of debate. Unfortunately,
it does not seem to have got us any closer to answers to the
fundamental questions that it raised. One could regard the
existing disagreements about UG as a sign of health. After all,
debate is the stuff of scientific inquiry: initial hypotheses are
often erroneous; it is by reformulating and refining them that
we gradually get closer to the truth. However, the kind of
development we see in UG theory is very different from what we
see in the natural sciences. In the latter, the successive theories
are gradual approximations to the truth. Consider an example
discussed by Asimov (1989). People once believed that the earth
is flat. Then, ancient Greek astronomers established that it was
spherical. In the seventeenth century, Newton argued that it was
an oblate spheroid (i.e., slightly squashed at the poles). In the
twentieth century, scientists discovered that it is not a perfect
oblate spheroid: the equatorial bulge is slightly bigger in the
southern hemisphere. Note that although the earlier theories
were false, they clearly approximated the truth: the correction
in going from “sphere” to “oblate spheroid,” or from “oblate
spheroid” to “slightly irregular oblate spheroid” is much smaller
than when going from “flat” to “spherical.” And while “slightly
irregular oblate spheroid” may not be entirely accurate, we are
extremely unlikely to discover tomorrow that the earth is conical
or cube-shaped. We do not see this sort of approximation in
work in the UG approach: what we see instead is wildly different
ideas being constantly proposed and abandoned. After more
than half a century of intensive research we are no nearer to
understanding what UG is than we were when Chomsky first used
the term.
This lack of progress, I suggest, is a consequence of the way that
the basic questions are conceptualized in the UG approach, and
the strategy that it adopts in attempting to answer them. Let us
consider a recent example. Berwick et al. (2011) list four factors
determining the outcome of language acquisition:
(1) innate, domain-specific factors;
(2) innate, domain-general factors;
(3) external stimuli;
(4) natural law.
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They go on to assert that the goal of linguistic theory is to
explain how these factors “conspire to yield human language” (p.
1223), and that “on any view, (1) is crucial, at least in the initial
mapping of external data to linguistic experience” (p. 1209).
There are three problems with this approach. First, it assumes
that innate language-specific factors are “crucial.” It may well be
that this is true; however, such a statement should be the outcome
of a research program, not the initial assumption.
Secondly, Berwick et al. (2011) appear to assume that the
four types of factors are separate and isolable: a particular
principle can be attributed to factor 1, 2, 3, or 4. The problem
is that one cannot attribute specific properties of complex
systems to individual factors, since they emerge from the
interaction of various factors (Elman et al., 1996; Bates, 2003;
MacWhinney, 2005). Asking whether a particular principle is
“innate” or due to “external stimuli” is meaningless—it is both:
genes and the environment interact in myriad ways at different
levels (molecular, cellular, at the level of the organism, and
in the external environment, both physical and social). Asking
whether something is “domain general” or “domain specific”
may be equally unhelpful. Presumably everybody, including the
staunchest nativists, agrees that (the different components of)
what we call the language faculty arose out of some non-linguistic
precursors. Bates (2003) argues that language is “a new machine
built out of old parts”; she also suggests that the “old parts”
(memory consolidation, motor planning, attention) “have kept
their day jobs” (Bates, 1999). However, it is perfectly possible that
they have undergone further selection as a result of the role they
play in language, so that language is now their “day job,” although
they continue to “moonlight” doing other jobs.
Finally, Berwick et al. (2011) like most researchers working in
the UG tradition, assume that one can determine which aspects of
language can be attributed to which factor by ratiocination rather
than empirical enquiry: “the best overall strategy for identifying
the relative contributions of (1–4) to human linguistic knowledge
is to formulate POS arguments that reveal a priori assumptions
that theorists can reduce to more basic linguistic principles”
(p. 1210). This “logical” approach to language learnability
is a philosophical rather than a scientific stance, somewhat
reminiscent of Zeno’s argument that motion could not exist. Zeno
of Elea was an ancient Greek philosopher who “proved,” through
a series of paradoxes (Achilles and the tortoise, the dichotomy
argument, the arrow in flight), thatmotion is an illusion.However,
Zeno’s paradoxes, intriguing as they are, are not a contribution to
the study of physics: in fact, we would not have modern physics if
we simply accepted his argument.
Virtually everyone agrees that there is something unique about
humans that makes language acquisition possible. There is a
growing consensus, even in the generativist camp, that the “big
mean UG” of the Principles and Parameters model is not tenable:
UG, if it exists, is fairly minimal,5 and most of the interesting
properties of human languages arise through the interaction of
innate capacities and predispositions and environmental factors.
This view has long been part of the constructivist outlook
(Piaget, 1954; Bates and MacWhinney, 1979; Karmiloff-Smith,
1992; MacWhinney, 1999, 2005; O’Grady, 2008, 2010), and it is
encouraging to see the two traditions in cognitive science are
converging, to some extent at least.
The great challenge is to understand exactly how genes and
environment interact during individual development, and how
languages evolve and change as a result of interactions between
individuals. To do this, it is crucial to examine interactions
at different levels. Genes do not interact with the primary
linguistic data: they build proteins which build brains which
learn to “represent” language and the external environment
by interacting with it via the body. It is unlikely that we
will be able to tease apart the contribution of the different
factors by ratiocination: the interactions are just too complex,
and they often lead to unexpected results (Thelen and Smith,
1994; Elman et al., 1996; Bates, 2003; MacWhinney, 2005). We
have already made some headway in this area. Further progress
will require empirical research and the coordinated efforts of
many disciplines, from molecular biology to psychology and
linguistics.
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